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Abstract
Many governance reform proposals are based on the view that boards have been too friendly
to executives, for example, by awarding them excessive pay. Although boards are often on friendly
terms with executives, it is less clear that they have systematically failed to function in the interests
of shareholders. Understanding board monitoring requires a theory of boards that takes into account
how rms provide incentives for their CEOs through other means. We develop a model in which a
CEOs ownership stake and private benets have opposite e¤ects on his willingness to share private
information with an independent board of directors. To encourage the CEO to communicate, the
board may optimally commit to a low monitoring intensity when either CEO ownership is low
or private benets are high. Our model suggests that the existing cross-section evidence on the
correlation between board composition and CEO ownership and tenure needs reevaluation. Using
a new proxy for board monitoring, we provide new evidence that this cross-sectional correlation
appears to be non-monotonic, with board independence rst decreasing and then increasing in CEO
ownership and tenure. We discuss the implications of our model for the design and evaluation of
governance structures.
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1 Introduction
All recent proposals for governance reform call for a more active monitoring role of boards
through increased independence. As evidence that boards have failed to do their work prop-
erly, many point to the corporate and accounting scandals at Enron, Tyco and Worldcom.
For example, in its report on Enrons collapse, the US Senate argued that by not question-
ing management about the complicated nancial transactions Enron was engaging in, the
board had failed in its duciary duties to shareholders (U.S. House, 2002). Others question
how boards award executive compensation. Especially in the US, concerns that CEO pay
is too high to be compatible with shareholder value maximization are widespread (e.g. Be-
bchuk and Fried, 2003). Additional concerns are the size of the pay-performance relation
(e.g. Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Hall and Liebman, 1998), contractual puzzles such as the
resetting of under-water options and the lack of indexing at the industry level (Hall and
Murphy, 2003), and more recently the options backdating scandal (Lie, 2005). However,
there is also a substantial body of research that supports the contrarian view that CEO pay
levels have little to do with weak boards (e.g. Holmström and Kaplan, 2003; Gabaix and
Landier, 2007; Frydman and Saks, 2007). Part of the reason for the conicting views about
boards is that there is no robust empirical evidence that board independence improves rm
performance (Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach, 2009), which is considered a puzzle by many
nancial economists.2 Nevertheless, the view that strong boards are desirable is almost never
questioned.
One of our goals in this paper is to challenge this view. As with almost everything, board
independence comes with benets and costs. Corporate scandals are clear (and expensive)
evidence that board monitoring may have been ine¤ective. Because independent directors
are assumed to be better monitors of CEOs, in times of corporate scandals there is a natural
tendency to over-emphasize the benets of board independence and to forget about its costs.
We believe any serious attempt to evaluate the performance of boards should be guided by
a theory that takes the benets of board monitoring, but also its costs, into account.
The model we develop in this paper highlights an usually neglected cost of board mon-
2 This empirical puzzle has led some to recognize that board independence alone might not be enough to
improve governance (e.g. Morck, 2004).
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itoring: the possibility of breakdowns in communication between CEOs and directors. The
special feature of this cost is that it arises endogenously and cannot be easily overcome. As
a consequence, since board monitoring is just one of many governance mechanisms, share-
holders should rely less on board monitoring whenever communication between CEOs and
boards is important. This argument is consistent with recent evidence that tough monitoring
by boards may be detrimental to rm performance. Adams and Ferreira (2008) suggest that
tough monitoring by boards can reduce rm value in rms that have few anti-takeover pro-
visions. Schmidt (2008) nds that management-friendly boards improve acquisition returns
in rms in need of more board advice. Adams (2009a) nds evidence that directors who
have a stronger monitoring role perceive that they receive less information from the CEO.
Consistent with board independence being costly, Ferreira, Ferreira and Raposo (2007) nd
that board independence is lower in rms in which external governance mechanisms are more
e¤ective.
We develop a model in which overmonitoring by the board may lead to a breakdown in
communication between the CEO and the board. Recent theoretical papers on boards also
emphasize communication between the CEO and the board (see e.g. Adams and Ferreira,
2007). We add to this literature by explicitly analyzing the impact of CEO ownership and
private benets on CEOsincentives to share information with the board. We also derive
implications for the optimal amount of board monitoring as a function of CEO ownership
and private benets.
Our model tries to capture important aspects of the special relationship between the
CEO and corporate directors. The board monitors the CEO by observing measures of
performance, it decides whether to dismiss the CEO, and it also advises the CEO. Advice
here is over an investment decision, where the quality of the boards advice is improved if
CEO provides it with some rm specic information.
Directors generally agree that their main responsibility is to hire and re the CEO (Lorsch
and MacIver, 1989), thus to fulll their duty of ensuring the best possible leadership for the
rm, directors collect information that helps them evaluate whether the CEO should remain
CEO. We dene this type of information collection to be the boards monitoring role.
Replacing the CEO, however, is a right that directors seldom exercise. In times of
normalcy, directors spend much more time acting as a sounding board for management and
advising management on the strategic direction of the rm. Specically, the board uses
the expertise of its members to make recommendations to the CEO. Most board members,
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however, need to rely on the CEO for rm-specic information. Thus, the quality of the
boards advice is improved when the CEO shares its private information with the board.
Given that the board monitors him, a CEO who is uncertain about his ability may face
a trade-o¤ in sharing information. On the one hand, the board will give better advice if the
CEO shares his information. On the other hand, the additional information may cause the
board to revise its previous good opinion of the CEO and re him. As Lorsch and MacIver
(1989, p. 181) point out each director is engaged in an ongoing assessment of the CEOs
performance, as he or she listens to the chiefs report. Information revealed by the CEO
helps the board disentangle the e¤ects of CEO ability on corporate performance from those
due to conditions beyond the CEOs control. The more precise the boards information about
the CEOs ability, the greater the risk a CEO whose job is currently secure faces. Thus, a
CEO may hesitate to communicate rm specic information to a board that monitors him
too intensively.3
The predictions of our model can be explored empirically. For example, the model implies
a (roughly) U-shaped relation between monitoring and CEO ownership and private benets,
i.e. monitoring decreases then increases with CEO ownership and private benets. Our
theory suggests extensions to prior empirical analyses of these issues. Weisbach (1988)
and Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) analyze the cross-sectional relationship between board
independence, CEO ownership, and CEO tenure. They nd that board independence is
negatively related to both CEO ownership and tenure. More recent evidence in Boone,
Fields, Karpo¤ and Raheja (2007), Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2008) and Linck, Netter
and Yang (2008) suggests these ndings are robust across samples and time periods. This
evidence is consistent with CEOs taking an active role in inuencing the choice of directors
and with more powerful CEOs being able to select a less independent board, as argued, for
example, by Hermalin and Weisbach (1998). Our model, however, suggests that previous
empirical specications are not exible enough to capture more nuanced possibilities.
We predict that board monitoring should be related to CEO ownership and tenure in a
non-monotonic fashion. We show that allowing for these non-monotonicities by augmenting
previous specications encountered in the literature generates a di¤erent pattern of evidence
in a cross-section of rms. In particular, we nd that board independence and CEO owner-
3 Our model is related to models in which strong incentives or monitoring intensity lead to "rationally-
myopic" behaviors by agents who manipulate or withhold information in detriment of long run prots. See
for example Stein (1989) or Tirole (2006, chapter 7).
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ship are negatively correlated when CEO ownership is low, but positively correlated when
CEO ownership is su¢ ciently high. Similarly, we nd that board independence and CEO
tenure are negatively correlated when CEO tenure is low, but positively correlated when
CEO tenured is su¢ ciently high. While these ndings do not necessarily rule out the idea
that powerful CEOs select less independent boards, it is not clear how this explanation can
generate the non-monotonic relationship we document.
Our empirical results are fairly robust to changes in specications and are statistically
and economically signicant. Furthermore, the results are unchanged when we use a proxy
for board monitoring which tries to infer monitoring intensity from the total number of board
committee meetings devoted to monitoring, rather than the proportion of outsiders on the
board as a measure of board monitoring. Recent literature argues that regulatory denitions
of director independence are awed because they do not capture social relations between
directors and the CEO that may impair a directors judgement in monitoring (Cohen, Frazz-
ini and Malloy, 2009; Hwang and Kim, 2008). This new proxy circumvents this problem
by focusing on director tasks. Furthermore, this proxy has fewer alternative interpretations
than director independence, which has also been used as a proxy for directorsexpertise (e.g.
Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 2008; Linck, Netter and Yang, 2008). We view the use of this
proxy as an additional contribution of this paper.
We do not expect our ndings to be considered as ultimate evidence corroborating our
model. In order to remain tractable, our model abstracts from many important issues, such
as the design of optimal CEO compensation and the inuence of CEOs on the selection
of directors. The evidence is not rich enough to separate every possible e¤ect. Even more
problematic, causation cannot be inferred from correlation. However, we believe the evidence
illustrates the importance of theory as a guide for empirical work. Our theory predicts a
more complex relationship between board monitoring and CEO ownership and tenure than
the ones that have been estimated so far in cross-sectional data. Without such a theory in
mind, or another one that generates similar implications, there is no good reason to search
for these complex relationships in the data.
Our analysis leads us to question the emphasis put on director independence in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002, the revised listing standards at the NYSE and Nas-
daq, and the numerous recent governance codes around the world. We believe the problems
displayed by banks in the recent nancial crisis support our argument that the costs of in-
dependence may outweigh its benets when communication between directors and the CEO
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is important. The activities of banks are arguably more complex than those of other institu-
tions, which suggests that information exchange between CEOs and directors is essential in
order for bank boards to carry out their responsibilities. Furthermore, on average CEOs of
banks have lower ownership than CEOs of non-nancial rms, as documented in Adams and
Mehran (2003). If we assume that we are in the region of our model where independence
is increasing with ownership, this suggests that banks should have lower independence to
encourage information-sharing. However, as Adams (2009b) documents, on average banks
actually have higher levels of independence than non-nancial rms. One reason may be that
regulators demand better compliance with SOX. Adams (2009b) provides further evidence
that increased independence may have decreased value for banks. She shows that banks
that were bailed out by the US government had more independent boards than other banks.
While several explanations are possible, our analysis suggests that excess independence may
have lead to communication breakdowns between CEOs and boards. This interpretation
is supported by the OECD Steering Group on Corporate Governances (Kirkpatrick, 2009)
argument that bank boards had problems obtaining information.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We discuss the related literature in
Section 2. We develop the theory in Section 3 and discuss our empirical evidence in Section
4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Becht, Bolton and Röell (2002), in their survey of corporate governance, stress the relative
scarcity of theoretical analyses of corporate boards, in contrast with other topics in corporate
governance, such as takeovers and nancial contracting. Since then, there has been a sharp
increase in the number of theoretical papers concerned with boards. In this new generation
of models, two ideas play a central role. First, it is acknowledged that boards not only
monitor management, but that they also have an important advisory role. Second, there is
a great emphasis on the problem of communication between the board and the CEO. Here
we briey review four recent models in this tradition and discuss their relations with our
model.
In Adams and Ferreira (2007), we analyze the conict that arises when a board that
has a dual role as a monitor and as an advisor of management needs to extract relevant
information from a CEO who dislikes excessive monitoring by the board. We show that it
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might be optimal for the board to commit to a low level of monitoring intensity in order to
provide the CEO with incentives to communicate openly with the board. The model in this
paper shares these same features, but di¤ers in two important aspects. First, as in previous
works on boards, such as Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) and Warther (1998), the need for
board monitoring arises from selection rather than moral hazard problems. Second, and
most importantly, the model in this paper generates predictions concerning the relationship
between CEO ownership and board monitoring, which is the main contribution of this paper.
In Adams and Ferreira (2007), we model CEOsand shareholdersincentive alignment in a
reduced-form fashion, which does not enable us to generate implications for CEO ownership.
Raheja (2005) also emphasizes the role of information transmission between the board
and the CEO in a model in which outside directors are less informed than inside directors
and the CEO. The distinguishing element in her analysis is her focus on the role of inside
directors as providers of information that is useful for monitoring the CEO. Based on an
explicit modeling of the motivations and incentives of inside and outside directors, she derives
implications for the optimal size and composition of boards.
Song and Thakor (2006) analyze a problem that is, in many aspects, similar to the one in
this paper. The main di¤erence is that, in their model, not only the CEO but also directors
have career concerns. They show that directors and CEOs career concerns interact in
important ways, and they generate many interesting implications that are unique to their
framework. In particular, the CEOs incentives to disclose high-precision information to the
board depend crucially on the career concerns of board members.
Finally, Harris and Raviv (2008) develop a model that combines many of the elements
mentioned above. Their distinguishing feature is a focus on the optimal delegation of
decision-making between insiders and outsiders, leading to a theory of board control.
The model in this paper shares many features with the models discussed above. The
distinguishing feature of our model is its ability to generate implications relating CEO own-
ership, private benets, and board monitoring. Furthermore, we also provide some new
evidence corroborating the model.
3 Model
In section 3.1, we describe the setup of the model. In section 3.2 we analyze the model
for a xed monitoring intensity of the board. We relax the assumption that the monitoring
6
intensity is xed in section 3.3 and analyze the comparative statics of the boards monitoring
intensity in section 3.4.
3.1 Setup
3.1.1 Timing
Our model has three periods.
Period 0 In period 0 the rm is established and shareholders hire a CEO. Shareholders
choose the optimal level of monitoring  to evaluate the CEOs ability. They choose a board
that will monitor the CEO with intensity . We interpret the monitoring intensity parameter
as a measure of board independence. Alternatively, independence could a¤ect the costs of
monitoring as in Adams and Ferreira (2007), leading to the same qualitative conclusion that
more independent boards monitor more intensively.
The CEO owns an exogenous fraction w of the rm, as the result of a compensation
package to induce unmodeled CEO e¤ort, for example.
Period 1 In period 1 the CEO and the board face a non-routine or innovative risky
investment decision, such as whether to enter a new product market or not. We assume that
this decision is non-routine because on routine issues the board is unlikely to have much of
an advisory role. The board observes its own private signal " about the protability of the
project. The CEO also receives a private signal s about the rms environment that will help
him choose whether or not to undertake the project. This information is uncorrelated with
the CEOs ability; for example, the information is about the rms access to distribution
channels or the size of the market. However, a high-ability CEO receives a high-precision
signal of rm conditions.4
The CEO then decides whether to reveal his signal to the board or not. After listening
to the CEOs report, the board advises the CEO on whether to implement the project or
not. We describe the advisory process in more detail below.
At the end of period 1, the CEO chooses whether to implement the project or not.
4 Managerial ability is characterized in a similar way in Scharfstein and Stein (1990) and Prendergast
and Stole (1996).
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Period 2 At the beginning of period 2, the board investigates (monitors) the quality of
the CEOs information by collecting information about the rms environment with intensity
, and uses this information to update its beliefs about the CEOs ability. Shareholders (and
the board) care about managerial ability because CEOs with more precise signals will make
better decisions. We assume that project outputis not easily observable or, equivalently,
that the output can only be veried in the long run, while decisions about the retention of
the current CEO must be made before the output becomes fully observable.5 On the basis
of its evaluation, the board decides whether to re the CEO and hire a replacement at the
beginning of the second period. The CEO loses his private benets if he is red, therefore
he cares about his job security.
At the end of period 2 the rm is liquidated and all players are compensated out of
rst-period project revenues and second-period revenues.
3.1.2 Remarks on the main assumptions
Sharing information with the board Before the board advises the CEO, the CEO
must decide whether to share his information with the board. Initially, the board believes
the ability of the CEO to be high enough so that it will not re him unless it obtains
information that causes it to change its mind. The CEO is uncertain about his ability, thus
any action he takes that allows the board to learn more about his ability imposes a risk
on him. Since his job is initially secure, learning by the board can only hurt him. If the
board did not monitor him, the CEO would reveal his information since it does not reect
directly on his ability, and with more information the boards advice is improved and the
value of the CEOs shareholdings increases. However, when the board monitors him, the
CEOs information enables the board to update its prior on the CEOs ability. Thus the
boards posterior on the CEOs ability is more precise when the CEO reveals his information.
Since without monitoring the board would not have red him, the probability that the board
res the CEO increases when the board has a more precise posterior on his ability.6 In
making his decision, the CEO must weigh the e¤ect his information has on the value of his
5 This assumption can be relaxed. As long as the nal output is not completely informative about the
CEOs ability, our model would still yield similar qualitative results. See also Ferreira and Rezende (2007).
6 This is similar to the argument in Zwiebel (1995): with more information, the variance of the CEOs
estimated ability increases, so if the CEO is of high ability getting a bad draw is more likely and will hurt
him. If the CEO is of low ability, his chances of getting a good draw increase and he is better o¤. The
di¤erence here is that the manager does not know his actual ability.
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shareholdings versus on his job security.
The board can verify the CEOs information ex post, for example through reports, thus
when the CEO communicates his information to the board, it is always accurate. We also
assume that the board cannot induce the CEO to reveal his information by o¤ering him a
contract.7 This is similar to Aghion and Tirole (1997), where the act of communicating
information to the principal is noncontractible. Formally, this is a message game in which
the CEO can choose between two messages f;; sg, where ; stands for not revealand s is
the CEOs information when he chooses to reveal, but the messages themselves cannot be
contracted on.8 Due to the limited time they spend in the rm, directors may not be able
to evaluate what information they need unless management guides them, especially in the
situations in which the board is most likely to have an important advisory role: when the
issue at hand is non-routine.9 This makes it di¢ cult for them to implement contracts to
induce the CEO to reveal his information. One could incorporate this idea formally in our
model by making the arrival of the signal stochastic. If the CEO does not always obtain a
signal, the board cannot punish the CEO for not revealing information.
Advising A crucial assumption in our analysis is that the quality of boards advice is higher
when the CEO shares his private information with the board. There are many reasons why
this should be so. For example, the board might have limited time to evaluate competing
projects, and CEOs information might be useful in restricting the set of relevant projects
that need to be considered (Adams and Ferreira, 2007). Similarly, directors might have to
exert costly e¤ort to learn about investment opportunities and the CEOs private information
about rm-specic conditions might reduce the boards marginal cost of learning. Finally,
it could also be that the combined board expertise " is too complex to be transmitted in a
simple message, thus knowledge of the CEOs information might be useful in determining
which types of simple messages (a subset of the information contained in ") the board should
send to the CEO.
7 In fact, because his shareholdings increase in value when he reveals, the CEO does get a payo¤ for
revealing. If the board can give him enough shares, the CEO will reveal, as we show later. However, in
some cases it may be too costly for the board to induce revelation. This could correspond to a case where
the CEOs contract (number of shares) is xed ex ante and new projects arise unexpectedly. It may be too
costly to renegotiate the contract whenever this happens.
8 Milgrom (1981) provides an early example of such a model.
9 See Demb and Neubauer (1992, pp. 116-128) for a discussion of the problem that directors may not
know the right questions to ask when the CEOs strategy is not to disclose.
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For our results to hold, it is immaterial which of these cases is assumed. Accordingly, we
will simply assume that the quality of the boards advice is higher when the CEO reveals his
information. A rationalization of such an assumption can be found in Adams and Ferreira
(2007), although in a di¤erent setup.
3.1.3 Output Technology
The project outcome (if undertaken) at the end of the rst period is given by
y1 =  + "  c; (1)
where  is a parameter reecting rm-specic conditions, " is a parameter reecting the
boards expertise concerning industry or economy-wide conditions and c is the (a priori
known) cost of undertaking the project. If the project is not undertaken, y1 = 0:
To simplify the boards ring strategy, rm revenues at the end of the second period are
given by y2 = , where  is the CEOs ability. The board will dismiss the CEO if expected
second period output under his leadership, b, is less than expected second period output, ,
under a replacement CEO, i.e. b < .
We interpret the project implementation decision as a one-shot strategic decision that
has long-term implications. After the rm makes the decision, the board may replace the
current CEO with a new one. However, this change can only a¤ect part of the total long-run
output, y = y1 + y2; namely y2. We interpret the rst component y1 as the part of the
outcome that is due to the implementation decision only and is not a¤ected by the identity
of the CEO in charge.
3.1.4 Information
At the beginning of period zero, neither the board nor the CEO knows the CEOs ability ;
the exact rm-specic conditions  or the general conditions ". Instead, they have common
priors over ,  and ". They believe ,  and " are independently distributed, with  = H
with probability q and  = L with probability 1  q. For simplicity, rm specic conditions
can be either good G or bad B with equal probabilities. The random variable representing
the boards expertise concerning industry or economy-wide conditions " has a cumulative
distribution function F (:), which is continuous and has an unbounded domain.10 At the
10 These conditions are actually stronger than we need. We make them for simplicity.
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end of period zero, the CEO observes a signal s 2 fB; Gg of the rm-specic conditions.
The signal s equals the true value of  with probability 1 if the CEO has high ability H
and with probability p > 1
2
if the CEO has low ability L. Therefore, better CEOs receive
more precise estimates of true rm conditions .
Since CEOs do not know their ability, they are not able to signal their ability or can
rms sort CEOs ex ante by o¤ering a menu of contracts. This is a common assumption in
the literature on career concerns initiated by Holmström (1982/1999).
3.1.5 Monitoring Technology
The board monitors the CEO with probability , which we call its monitoring intensity.
Monitoring has two elements. When the board monitors, it may get a direct signal of the
CEOs ability  and also a signal of rm conditions . It learns the true managerial ability
 with probability t and the true rm conditions  with probability 1. Both signals will be
used in updating the boards beliefs about the CEOs ability. For simplicity, we assume that
the board does not observe any of the other actions of the CEOs, including the decision
concerning the project.11
Initially, the common prior on the CEOs ability is
 = qH + (1  q)L: (2)
If the board observes  but not , it will update its beliefs about the CEO if and only
if it also observes the CEOs signal s. In this case, the CEOs signal matches the boards
signal, i.e. s = , with probability 1 if the CEO is good and probability p if the CEO is bad.
Therefore, the unconditional probability of matching signals is P (s = )  q+(1  q) p and
the posterior beliefs on the mean of  are
 (s = ) =
q
P (s = )
H +
(1  q) p
P (s = )
L; (3)
 (s 6= ) = L:
Since the board would not have wanted to re the CEO at the beginning of the rst period,
when the CEOs expected ability is , the board will not re the CEO at the beginning of
11 This assumption can be relaxed without qualitative changes in the results. As long as the decision
concerning project implementation does not fully reveal the CEOs private information, the same trade-o¤
persists if we allow the board to observe the CEOs actions.
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the second period unless it obtains new information through monitoring. We summarize the
boards ring strategy formally in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Firing Rule) The board will re the CEO if and only if:
1. It observes the CEOs ability through monitoring (which happens with probability t)
and learns that  = L, or
2. it does not observe the CEOs ability directly, but learns that the CEOs signal s does
not match its own signal , i.e. s 6= .
When the board makes its recommendation concerning project implementation to the
CEO, it either knows the CEOs signal s or not. We denote its information at this point by
i 2 fB; G; ;g. We have that i = s if the board learns the CEOs signal s and i = ; if it
does not learn.
Given the boards ring rule, the expected second period output when the board monitors,
M(i); will depend on its information i:
M (s) = t [qH + (1  q)] + (1  t) fP (s = ) (s = ) + [1  P (s = )]g ; (4)
M (;) = t [qH + (1  q)] + (1  t):
Since
M (s) M (;) = (1  t) fqH + (1  q) pL + [(1  q) (1  p)  1]g > 0; (5)
expected second period output is higher when monitoring is more informed, i.e. when the
board learns s. We call the di¤erenceN M (s) M (;) the gains from informed monitoring.
3.1.6 Preferences
We will assume that when the board res him, the CEO retains his shares w.12 In addition,
the CEO receives control benets of b if he remains in control at the end of the second period.
Thus the CEOs utility function is given by
UM = w(y1 + y2) + bRemain in control; (6)
12 It does not alter the analysis much if he loses his shares and it simplies some of the comparative statics.
In fact managers do receive golden parachutes and if their shares are accumulated for their own accounts
they cannot be taken away. Only if the manager is given phantom or restricted stock can his stock privileges
be revoked.
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where
Remain in control =
(
1
0
if the CEO is not red
if the CEO is red.
(7)
Through his share in rst period output the CEO is interested in making a successful
project implementation decision. However, he also cares about his job security because if
he is red he may lose his control benets. In making his decision about whether to reveal,
therefore, the CEO faces the trade-o¤ that revealing information increases expected output
but is also costly because it may increase the probability that he is red.
The board is risk-neutral. We will assume that the board cares only about increasing
rm-value, y = y1 + y2. However, the extent to which the board can increase rm value is
limited because, in order to analyze the trade-o¤ to the CEO induced by the boards dual
role, we assume initially that the boards monitoring intensity  is xed.
With probability  the board monitors, in which case expected second period output
given its information is M(i): With probability 1   the board does not monitor, in which
case it does not re the CEO. Therefore, the boards expected utility function is given by:
EUB = E [y1 + M(i) + (1  )] (8)
3.2 Analysis of the Model for a Fixed Monitoring Intensity
This section analyses the model when the boards monitoring intensity  is xed. In section
3.3 we relax this assumption.
At each of its information sets along the equilibrium path the board must behave opti-
mally given its beliefs. It chooses whether or not to recommend project implementation and
gathers information on rm-specic conditions with monitoring intensity . If the board
monitors, it observes  with probability 1 and updates its beliefs about the CEOs ability
if it also observes  or if it learns the CEOs signal s. It then decides whether to re the
CEO. The CEO must decide whether or not to reveal his information and whether or not to
implement the project given the boards recommendation.
We focus on strategy proles and belief systems for the board and the CEO that constitute
perfect Bayesian equilibria. When the game is in its monitoring phase, the boards optimal
behavior is fully characterized by its ring rule derived in Proposition 1. Therefore, in
subsection 3.2.1 we only consider the e¤ects of the playersbehaviors on rst-period output y1.
We then work backwards and analyze the CEOs decision to share information in subsection
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3.2.2.
3.2.1 Information and the Quality of Advice
This section describes the advice the board gives to the CEO and the CEOs optimal choice
of whether to follow the boards advice or not.
To solve the problem, we start by analyzing the continuation games that arise after
the CEOs decision to share information is made. There are only two possible types of
continuation games at this stage: one in which the board learns the CEOs signal s and one
in which it does not.
When the CEOs and the boards strategies constitute an equilibrium, we denote the
CEOs expectation of the rst period outcome given his signal s when he reveals his infor-
mation to the board (i.e. i = s) by E [y1 j s; i = s]. Similarly, when the CEO does not reveal
his information to the board (i.e. i = ;), this expectation is E [y1 j s; i = ;]. Implicitly in
the denition of these expectations we are assuming Bayesian updating of probabilities along
the equilibrium path.
We dene the advisory benets from information sharing as
R (s)  E [y1 j s; i = s]  E [y1 j s; i = ;] : (9)
Our results depend only on the following weak assumption on the function R (s).
Assumption 1 (Information Sharing Implies Better Advice):
1. The advisory benets from information sharing are non-negative for all s:
R (s)  0;
2. At least one of R (B) and R (G) is strictly positive:
max fR (G) ; R (B)g > 0:
The main implications of our model depend only on these two properties of the function
R (s). For simplicity, we state them as an assumption, but an explicit modeling of the
communication game in which these properties emerge endogenously is available from the
authors.
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3.2.2 The Decision to Share Information
Here we analyze the rst-period decision problem for the CEO. To decide his strategy the
CEO compares his expected utilities from revealing and not revealing his information. The
expected utility for the CEO when the board learns his information is given by
EUM (s; i = s) = wE [y1 j s; i = s] + wM (s) + (1  )w+ b (10)
  ft (1  q) + (1  t) [q + (1  q) (1  p)]g b:
If the board does not learn s, the CEOs expected utility is given by
EUM (s; i = ;) = wE [y1 j s; i = ;] + wM (;) + (1  )w+ b  t (1  q) b: (11)
The monitoring benets from information sharing are given by w (M (s) M (;)) =
wN . We dene the costs from information sharing to be
C =  (1  t) [q + (1  q) (1  p)] b: (12)
It is important to note that the costs from information revealing increase both with the
monitoring intensity  and with the private benets of control b. To simplify notation, we
dene
  (1  t) [q + (1  q) (1  p)] : (13)
We now characterize the equilibrium when the monitoring intensity  is xed. For sim-
plicity, we assume that when the CEO is indi¤erent between revealing or not revealing his
signal to the board in equilibrium, he will choose to reveal.
Dene 0 as
0  wmax fR (G) ; R (B)g
b  wN : (14)
We have the following result:
Proposition 2 (Monitoring Intensity and Information Sharing) The equilibrium is
such that:
1. if b > wN , and
(a) if   0 , the CEO always reveals s;
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(b) if  > 0, the CEO never reveals s:
2. If b  wN , the CEO always reveals s:
According to this proposition, there exist equilibria in which CEOs will not share infor-
mation with the board. Since rm value is higher when the CEO does share his information,
this proposition provides the motivation for boards who take their duciary duties seriously
to nd instruments with which they can increase the CEOs net gain to sharing information.
When it is too costly for a rms board to a¤ect the CEOs incentives to share information,
this proposition explains why the shareholders will change their board in order to nd one
with which the CEO will communicate.
3.3 Endogenizing the Boards Monitoring Intensity
In the previous section, we argue that when the boards preference for monitoring is xed,
CEOs may not share their information with the board, depending on whether  > 0 or not.
Here we discuss the equilibria that arise when the board commits to a choice of monitoring
intensity ex ante in order to maximize shareholder value. We will assume that it costs the
board d() to change its monitoring intensity .13 We assume d (0) = 0; d0 > 0; d00 >
0; lim!0 d0 () = 0; lim!1 d0 () =1:
For the sake of brevity, we assume from now on that b > wN; so that only part 1 of
Proposition 2 is relevant. If this assumption does not hold, the problem is still well dened.
However, the monitoring benets from information sharing would always be larger than the
costs from information sharing, implying that the CEO faces no trade-o¤ between revealing
and not revealing. We therefore focus on the more interesting case in which this trade-o¤ is
present, which is more likely to occur when private benets of control b are high and CEO
ownership w are low.
Let m (s; ) be the message the CEO sends to the board when his private information is
s and the monitoring intensity is . From proposition 2, we have that
m (s; ) =
(
s; if   0
;, if  > 0 : (15)
13 For example, this could be a result of coordination costs (e.g. Yermack, 1996).
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Messages a¤ect rst period outcomes through their e¤ect on the quality of the advice
the board can o¤er to the CEO:
E [y1 j m (s; )] =
(
1
2
E [y1 j s = G; i = s] + 12E [y1 j s = B; i = s] ; if m (s; ) = s
1
2
E [y1 j s = G; i = ;] + 12E [y1 j s = B; i = ;] ; if m (s; ) = ;:
(16)
Messages a¤ect second-period outcomes through their e¤ect on the quality of the boards
monitoring M [m (s; )].
The boards problem can then be written as
max

E [y1 j m (s; )] + M [m (s; )] + (1  )  d () (17)
The next proposition describe the main properties of the equilibrium.
Proposition 3 (Optimal Choice of Monitoring) The equilibrium is always unique (with
respect to the choice of ) and it is of one of the following three types:
1. The optimal monitoring intensity  is f < 0 and the CEO shares his information
m (s; ) = s. Furthermore, the board chooses the rst-best level of monitoring and
both rst- and second-period outputs are at their rst-best levels.
2. The optimal monitoring intensity  is 0 and the CEO shares his informationm (s; ) =
s. Although the rst-best level of outcome is achieved in period one, the same is not
true for the second period outcome, since there is too little monitoring.
3. The optimal monitoring intensity  is n > 0 and the CEO does not share his in-
formation m (s; ) = ;. Neither the rst- nor the second-period outputs are at their
rst-best levels.
In the rst equilibrium the CEOs revelation constraint is not binding. In the second
equilibrium the CEOs revelation constraint is binding but the value of the CEOs information
is high enough that the board will optimally commit to a smaller monitoring intensity than
the rst best level to induce the CEO to reveal it.14 In the third equilibrium the CEOs
revelation constraint is binding but it is too costly to induce the CEO to reveal. Since, the
boards preferred monitoring intensity is highest when there is full communication (since the
option value of ring the CEO is highest when he reveals), we dene the boards preference
for less than rst best monitoring to be management friendliness.
14 The argument that in certain situations too much information may hurt the principal has been studied
in other contexts. For example, Aghion and Tirole (1997) discuss how a principal may choose to delegate
formal authority to an agent when the agents private benets are high or when the principal cannot refrain
from hurting the agent. With more formal authority, the agent will participate more in the organization (e.g.
communicate information). Similarly, Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997) consider the trade-o¤ between
more initiative by management and more control through monitoring by shareholders.
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3.4 Comparative Statics on the Boards Monitoring Intensity
Here we discuss the results linking cross sectional di¤erences in monitoring intensity  to
CEOs shareholdings and his private benets
As CEO ownership increases, his net gain to revealing his information increases. Thus,
the optimal monitoring intensity in a sample of rms di¤ering in the amount of CEO own-
ership will vary non-monotonically as follows:
Proposition 4 (Relation between equilibrium monitoring and CEO ownership)
There exist levels of CEO ownership wf and wn where 0 < wn < wf such that:
1. the monitoring intensity of the board is at its rst-best level f if CEO ownership is
greater than wf ;
2. the optimal monitoring intensity of the board is  = 0 if CEO ownership is between
wf and wn;
3. the optimal monitoring intensity of the board is  = n if CEO ownership is below
wn.
The optimal monitoring intensity is a non-monotonic function of w. When w is very low,
boards monitor with intensity n. Beyond wn, monitoring initially drops then rises again.
At wn there is a discrete jump in the boards monitoring intensity due to the fact that the
CEO makes a discrete choice to reveal or not.
As the CEOs concern about being red increases, he is less likely to reveal his infor-
mation. Thus as b increases it will become more costly to induce him to reveal. Since rm
value is independent of the CEOs private benets b, the analysis of the optimal monitoring
intensity as a function of b is similar to the analysis for ownership. As a function of his
private benets, optimal monitoring varies non-monotonically as follows:
Proposition 5 (Relation between equilibrium monitoring and CEO private bene-
ts) There exist levels of private control benets bf and bn where 0 < bf < bn such that:
1. the monitoring intensity of the board is at the rst-best level f if private benets are
less than bf ;
2. the optimal monitoring intensity of the board is  = 0 if private benets are between
bf and bn;
3. the optimal monitoring intensity of the board is  = n if private benets are above
bn.
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As is the case for ownership, the optimal monitoring intensity is a non-monotonic function
of b: When b is low, boards monitor with the rst best intensity f . Beyond bf , monitoring
decreases then jumps up again to n.
4 Testable Implications and Some Evidence
The model implies a (roughly) U-shaped relation between board monitoring and both CEO
ownership and private benets, i.e. monitoring decreases then increases with these character-
istics of the CEOs incentive structure. Thus, while it would be di¢ cult to test the models
implications concerning the extent to which CEOs share information with their boards,15
the implied cross-sectional relationships between monitoring and both incentive alignment
and private benets can, in principle, be examined empirically. Using a cross section of 358
Fortune 500 rms in scal 1998, we conduct a brief examination to determine whether the
evidence appears consistent with the predictions of the model.
The key step to implementing the empirical examination is to develop appropriate prox-
ies for the boards monitoring intensity. The proxies for the CEOs ownership and private
benets are more straightforward.
Proxies for the boards monitoring intensity In accordance with the traditional
assumption that board composition determines the boards monitoring strength, we rein-
terpret the probability that the board monitors the CEO as a xed parameter representing
the percentage of outside directors on the board (see e.g. Baysinger and Butler, 1985, and
Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). This proxy has been criticized for not taking into account
social relations between directors and the CEO (Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy, 2009; Hwang
and Kim, 2008). Furthermore, it may also be awed if inside directors have information that
allows them to be more e¤ective monitors.
We also use a di¤erent proxy for the boards monitoring intensity than previously used.
In particular, we attempt to measure the monitoring intensity of the board independently of
its advisory function by using a proxy developed in Adams (2003). We use board committee
descriptions as a way of separating the boards monitoring from its non-monitoring tasks.
Then we construct a proxy for the probability that the board monitors the CEO by using
15 Although see Adams (2009a) and Schmidt (2008) for some recent steps in this direction.
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committee size and meeting data to estimate the proportion of director meetings allocated
to monitoring duties. This proxy combines the idea that activity (the number of meetings)
matters for monitoring as well as the number of directors monitoring.16
Since this proxy is based on board activity and size, it is independent of board com-
position. Boards and committees either have regular or special meetings. However, special
meetings are rare.17 Thus it is plausible that directors can commit to a given monitoring
intensity through their scheduling of board and committee meetings. One advantage of this
proxy is that it avoids the problem pointed out in recent literature that regulatory denitions
of director independence are awed because they do not capture social relations between di-
rectors and the CEO (Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy, 2009; Hwang and Kim, 2008). Another
advantage is that it has fewer alternative interpretations than independence, which can also
proxy for the extent to which the board has rm-specic knowledge, as in Coles, Daniel and
Naveen (2008).
Proxies for CEO ownership and private benets We proxy the extent to which
CEOs care about increasing rm value by their shareholdings. Because in the model the
CEO cares about his job security due to fear of losing his private benets, it is reasonable
to assume that the longer the CEO has been in the rm the smaller are his private benets
(because there are fewer periods remaining until retirement). Thus, consistent with Gibbons
and Murphy (1992) and Brickley, Coles and Linck (1999), we use a measure of CEO tenure
to proxy for the CEOs internal career concerns.
We also use a dummy variable indicating whether the CEO is also the chairman of the
board as a measure of his private benets. Many rms (see e.g. Vancil 1987) have a well-
dened succession process that can be described as follows: the president, (or other heir
apparent to the CEO) becomes CEO and president. After a probationary period he receives
the additional title of chairman. As part of his succession process he relinquishes rst the
title of president, then the title of CEO, and nally the title of chairman. Once the CEO
becomes chairman he has no further title to aspire to, so his concerns about job security
are likely to be smaller than before. In addition, he is more likely to be closer to the end
16 The assumption that the number of directors matters for monitoring is similar to the assumption in the
literature that uses the supervisor/worker ratio to test e¢ ciency wage theories (see Prendergast, 1999, for a
summary).
17 Only 5.5% of the sample rms had special board meetings. Only 4% of the 1561 board committees in
the sample rms had special meetings.
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of his career than the beginning. Thus we expect to observe a positive relation between the
CEO=chair dummy and the monitoring intensity of the board.
4.1 Data sources and Description
For all publicly traded Fortune 500 companies in 1998 for which we could obtain proxy
statements or 10-Ks from Disclosure Global Access we collected data on board and CEO
characteristics during scal 1998. We exclude nancial rms and utilities. Our nal sample
consists of 358 rms.
For each rm we collected the following information about its board: the proportion of
insiders, board size, number of meetings, the number and types of committees, and the size
and number of meetings of each committee during scal 1998. For six of the rms we could
only obtain 10-Ks that do not disclose committee information. Thus our nal sample of
committees contains 1565 committees from 352 rms. In addition we collected the number
of years the CEO has been on the board and the proportion of shares the CEO holds in the
rm.18 Financial data are from Compustat. Data on the number of years since the date of
incorporation are from Moodys manuals.
Since proxy statements only selectively disclose the year the CEO joined the rm, we use
the number of years the CEO has been on the board as a proxy for the CEOs tenure in the
rm. We dene the proportion of outsiders on the board to be the proportion of directors
who do not work for the rm.
We construct our second proxy for the boards monitoring intensity as follows: we de-
ne meeting units spent on the work of a committee to be the number of directors on the
committee times the number of regular meetings of that committee during scal 1998. The
number of meeting units spent on monitoring duties is the sum of meeting units devoted to
the compensation, audit, corporate governance, nominating, non-managing director, succes-
sion, and stock option committees. Total meeting units are the sum of total meeting units
spent on committee work and the meeting units spent on board work (=board size times
number of regular board meetings). A proxy for the boards monitoring intensity is then the
fraction of total meeting units spent monitoring (for more information see Adams, 2003).
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for selected nancial and board characteristics. The
18 We dene the CEOs shareholdings to be the sum of common shares, deferred shares, restricted shares
and shares held for family members minus options exercisable within 60 days.
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correlation between the fraction of outsiders and the fraction of total meeting units spent
monitoring is 0.24, thus the dependent variables seem to be su¢ ciently di¤erent to warrant
using both.
4.2 Empirical Results
Several empirical papers have already found a negative relationship between both top man-
agement ownership and tenure and the proportion of outsiders on the board (for example
Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999). To capture the non-monotonicity predicted by our model
we add quadratic terms of ownership and tenure to similar regressions. In addition, we
include the CEO=chairman dummy. To be consistent with the roughly U-shaped relations
predicted by our model, we expect to nd that the coe¢ cients on these additional terms are
positive.
As rm level controls we include the natural log of book value of assets as a measure
of size, capital expenditures over sales as a measure of growth, the number of 2-digit SIC
segments the rm operates in as a measure of diversication, the number of years since the
date of incorporation as a measure of age, return on assets as a measure of performance and
leverage (long term debt/book value of assets). In addition all specications include 2-digit
SIC industry dummies.
Table 2 presents the coe¢ cient estimates for all specications using board composition
as the dependent variable. Whites robust t-statistics are in parentheses to correct for
potential heteroskedasticity. To compare to the previous literature, Column I of table 2
shows the results of the OLS regression without the quadratic terms for CEO tenure and
ownership. The signs, magnitudes and pattern of signicance of the estimated coe¢ cients
on CEO tenure, ownership and the CEO=chairman dummy are very similar to the estimates
in a cross section of 336 Fortune 500 rms in Shivdasani and Yermack (1999, Table IV, rst
column).19
In Column II we add the quadratic terms for CEO tenure and ownership. Consistent with
the implications of the model, the coe¢ cients on both quadratic terms and the coe¢ cient
on the CEO=chairman dummy are positive, with the coe¢ cient on the square of ownership
signicant at the 5% level and the CEO=chairman dummy signicant at the 1% level. Once
19 Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) use a non-CEO chairman of the board dummy, so the sign on the
CEO=chairman dummy is the opposite of the estimated coe¢ cient in their paper.
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we include the quadratic term, ownership also becomes signicant (at the 5% level) unlike
in Column I, suggesting that the quadratic term was an omitted variable in Column I. In
Columns III and IV we include the quadratic terms for tenure and ownership separately
with similar results. In Column V we replicate Column II with board size and number
of committees as additional board level controls as in Shivdasani and Yermack (1999). All
relevant explanatory variables are signicant with the predicted signs in this specication.
In Table 3 we present the results using the fraction of total meeting units devoted to
monitoring as a proxy for the boards monitoring intensity. Overall the results are similar to
those in Table 2, yet suggest even more strongly than the results in Table 2 that the relation-
ship between the monitoring intensity by the board and both CEO tenure and ownership is
non-linear as implied by the model.
The estimated e¤ects also appear to be economically signicant. For example, if the CEO
is not the chairman of the board, the boards monitoring intensity is reduced by 0.06-0.08
(0.04-0.05) when the dependent variable is the fraction of outsiders (the fraction of meeting
units devoted to monitoring) compared to when the CEO is the chairman of the board. This
represents a reduction of approximately one half of the standard deviation in the boards
monitoring intensity.
If we focus on our new measure of monitoring (Table 3), we nd that the non-monotonic
e¤ects are also economically meaningful. Our results suggest that monitoring decreases with
tenure in the rst two years and increases with tenure after 3 years. It is interesting to note
that it usually takes two years for the CEO to become the chair of the board. Monitoring
also decreases with CEO ownership until 19%, when it starts to increase with ownership.
Note that, according to our model, monitoring should only increase with ownership when the
CEO becomes fully aligned with shareholders (concerning the information sharing decision).
Although potential endogeneity problems weaken the interpretation of the evidence, we
conclude that the raw evidence is at least not inconsistent with the empirically testable
implications of the model. In addition, while the results could also be consistent with
other explanations, we are unaware of other theories predicting a non-monotonic relationship
between board monitoring and CEO career concerns and ownership. For example, the results
do not appear consistent with traditional agency stories that predict that CEO power (or
entrenchment) is negatively associated with monitoring by the board. In such a case, one
might expect that when the CEO is the chairman of the board, monitoring by the board
decreases. In contrast, we nd that when the CEO takes on both roles, monitoring by
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the board increases. In addition, the entrenchment hypothesis implies that monitoring by
the board should decline over the course of the CEOs tenure (Hermalin and Weisbach,
1998). The increase in monitoring close to a CEOs retirement here is inconsistent with this
prediction.
5 Conclusion
Explicit theories of boards are useful, mostly because they can suggest new ways of looking
at the data. Our model has new empirical implications. Although our evidence in this paper
is only suggestive, it does raise some questions concerning the interpretation of previous
empirical ndings. A supercial glance at the empirical evidence may sometimes suggest
that boards are structured in ways that are not consistent with shareholder value maximiza-
tion. Our preliminary evidence in this paper suggests more caution in drawing inferences
from data: there are some cross-sectional relationships between board monitoring, CEO
ownership, and CEO tenure that defy explanations based on CEO power alone. Much more
empirical work is needed to assess the importance of CEO power for the design of gover-
nance structures. This is especially important because governance reform has been and will
continue to be an important priority for policy makers.
We believe recent governance reform proposals may have overemphasized the idea that in-
dependence serves to limit CEO power. Our analysis suggests that the value of independence
depends on other incentive mechanisms in place. Furthermore, the value of independence is
not linear. Thus, simply mandating an increase in independence for all rms is not the so-
lution to governance problems in all rms. Furthermore, focusing primarily on one incentive
mechanism may cause additional governance problems. Our analysis suggests, for example,
that rms may respond to increases in independence by increasing CEO ownership. But,
increases in ownership may lead to potentially excessive risk-taking by CEOs. The recent
concern about bank governance during the nancial crisis illustrates that SOX and the NYSE
and Nasdaq listing standards may not have been e¤ective in solving governance problems.
Several observers identify excessive director independence as a problem. In addition, many
argue that bank executives received too much performance pay which led them to undertake
strategies that were too risky. As a result, the OECD has launched an action plan to ad-
dress weaknesses in corporate governance. Some aspects of this plan seem like steps in the
right direction, for example, it emphasizes more than one incentive mechanism for CEOs.
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However, unless the interactions between incentive mechanisms are taken into account, it is
unlikely to solve all the problems it hopes to address.
6 Appendix
6.1 Proofs
Proof. (Proposition 1) Since P (s = ) = q + (1  q) p < 1; q
P (s=)
> q (and (1 q)p
P (s=)
=
1  q
P (s=)
< 1  q). Therefore
 (s = ) =
q
P (s = )
H +
(1  q) p
P (s = )
L
gives more weight to H than  does, which implies that  (s = ) >  >  (s 6= ) = L.
Therefore the board will retain the CEO if and only if it learns that he is of high ability or
the CEOs signal matches its own signal, i.e. s = :
Proof. (Proposition 2) Assume b > wN . Let   0 and let s0 2 argmaxR (s). By
Assumption 1, we know that R (s0) > 0. A CEO who receives a signal s0 chooses to reveal his
information if (assuming that the board assigns equal probabilities to both types whenever
the CEO does not reveal his information):
wR (s0)   (b  wN) :
But this condition holds in this case from   0. Therefore, the CEO will reveal his
information if s = s0. Consider now a CEO of type s00 6= s0 and suppose that he chooses not
reveal his signal. The board, however, knowing that if the CEO had a signal s0 he would
have chosen to reveal, correctly infers that s = s00. This makes the CEO indi¤erent between
revealing or not revealing his information when s = s00. Since we assume that ties are broken
in favor of revealing, we conclude that the CEO will choose to reveal his information when
s = s00 as well.
Now let  > 0. In this case, both types of CEOs (G or B) prefer not to reveal their
information, so this is an equilibrium.20
20 There may exist other perfect Bayesian equilibria in this case, ones in which both types reveal their
information, and when a deviation occurs and the CEO does not reveal his type, the board believes that one
of the types (either B or G) is more likely to be the one deviating, and assigns di¤erent probabilities to
each type after a deviation. We argue that these equilibria are unreasonable, for they require that the CEOs
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If b  wN , then pooling (non-revealing) equilibria do not exist, because the expected
gain from revealing when your type is s is
wR (s) +  (wN   b)  0
with strict inequality for at least one of the types. If both types reveal their information,
this is trivially an equilibrium.
Proof. (Proposition 3) Let f be such that
M (s)   = d0  f :
f is well-dened because M (s)    > 0 and we assumed that d (:) satises certain
regularity conditions.
Suppose rst that f  0. If the board chooses  = f , then by Proposition 2 the
CEO will choose to share his information. When there is information sharing, advising
is optimal and expected rst-period output is therefore maximized. But since f is the
unconstrained best choice of monitoring for the board, second-period output (which depends
only on monitoring) is at its rst-best level. This is the equilibrium in item 1.
Suppose now that f > 0. Now, the rst-best cannot be achieved anymore. If the board
wants to induce revelation, it will choose  = 0. Otherwise, it will choose  = n where
n is such that
M (;)   = d0 (n) :
n is well-dened because M (;)   > 0. The board will prefer choosing  = 0 if
E [y1 j m = s] + 0M (s) + (1  0)  d (0)
 E [y1 j m = ;] + nM (;) + (1  n)  d (n)
and will choose  = n otherwise. If it chooses  = 0, Proposition 2 implies that the
CEO will share his information m (s; ) = s. First-period output is maximized because the
board learns the CEOs information, but second-period output is not rst-best because there
is too little monitoring:  < f . This is the equilibrium in item 2.
right to remain silentsignals his information even though both types have incentives not to reveal. This
case is analogous to the right-to-silence game analyzed in Farrell and Rabin (1996). Instead of remaining
silent, the CEO could say you should not try to infer my information from the fact that I am not talking
to you, because it is in my own interest not to reveal my information to you no matter what it is.This
message, if believed, is credible. Assuming a rich common language (Farrell, 1993), these equilibria should
be ruled out because they are not neologism-proof.
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If the board chooses  = n, Proposition 2 implies that the CEO will not share his
information m (s; ) = ;. Expected rst-period output is not maximized because the board
does not learn the CEOs information, second-period output is also not rst-best because
the gains from monitoring are lower when there is no information sharing: M (;) < M (s).
This is the equilibrium in item 3.
Proof. (Proposition 4) Since 0(w) is a strictly increasing function of w, 0(0) = 0
and f does not depend on w, there exists a unique wf such that 0(wf ) = f . Since for all
w  wf , 0(w)  f the board will implement the rst best level of monitoring by choosing
to monitor with intensity f in this region by proposition 3 For all w < wf , the rst-best
cannot be implemented anymore. Now consider the boards expected utility when  = 0
and the CEO reveals. The derivative of the boards expected utility with respect to w is:
@EUB
@w
= [M(s)    d0 (0)] @
0
@w
:
Since f was chosen to satisfy M (s)      d0  f = 0 and d0 () > 0; we have for
all w < wf that M(s)      d0 (0) > 0. Since @0
@w
> 0, the boards expected utility is
strictly increasing in w. Since the boards expected utility when the CEO does not reveal is
independent of w, there exists a unique wn < wf , such that for all wf  w  wn the board
chooses to induce revelation by monitoring with intensity 0 and for all w < wn the board
chooses to monitor with intensity n.21 Now suppose that w = bw is such that n = 0.
In this case the boards expected utility is strictly greater when the CEO reveals, thereforebw > wn and there is a discontinuity in the boards strategy since at wn, n > 0.
Proof. (Proposition 5)The proof is analogous to the proof for the CEOs shareholdings
except that 0(b) is strictly decreasing in b and lim
b!wN

+
0(b) =1, so there exists a unique bf
such that 0(bf ) = f and the board can implement the rst-best monitoring probability f
for all b  bf . Since for all b > bf , M(s)    d0 (0) > 0 but @0
@b
< 0, the boards expected
utility is strictly decreasing in b in this region. Since the boards expected utility when the
manager does not reveal is independent of b, there exists a unique bn > bf ,such that for all
bf  b  bn the board chooses to induce revelation by monitoring with intensity 0 and for
all b > bn the board chooses to monitor with intensity n. Now suppose that b = bb is such
that n = 0. In this case the boards expected utility is strictly greater when the manager
21 We are assuming here that when w = 0 and the board chooses to induce revelation by monitoring at
intensity 0 = 0; the boards expected utility is smaller than when the CEO does not reveal and the board
monitors at n. If not, wn > 0 does not exist but the remainder of the proposition still holds.
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reveals, therefore bb < bn and there is a discontinuity in the boards strategy since at bn,
n > 0.
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
The sample consists of data on all non-financial, non-utility firms on the 1999 Fortune 500 list, for which proxy 
statements could be obtained. Data are for fiscal year 1998. Financial data are from Compustat. The number of 
business segments is equal to the number of 2-digit SIC codes segments the firm operates in. Leverage=long-term 
debt/book assets. Data on year of incorporation were taken from Moody’s Manuals. Governance characteristics 
were collected from proxy statements for the 1999 proxy season. These proxies contain data on governance 
characteristics during fiscal 1998. CEO=COB is a dummy indicating whether the CEO is the chairman of the 
board (yes=1). CEO tenure as director is the number of years the CEO has been on the board. CEO ownership is 
total cash flow rights in units of the company’s traded common stock not counting options exercisable within 60 
days. Some CEOs only hold shares in a different class of stock; those CEOs have zero common shareholdings. 
Board size is the number of directors sitting on the board at the beginning of fiscal 1998, which we calculate as 
the number of directors standing for election in 1999, plus the number that left the board, minus the number 
that was added during the year. The board size variable excludes advisory directors and director emeriti. We 
define outsiders to be all directors except those currently employed by the company. The estimate of number of 
director meeting units spent on the work of a committee is the number of directors on the committee times the 
number of regular meetings of that committee during fiscal 1998. Total meeting units spent on committee work 
are the sum of all meeting units spent on individual committees. Total meeting units are the sum of total 
meeting units spent on committee work and the meeting units spent on board work (=board size times number of 
regular board meetings). We define the number of meeting units devoted to monitoring duties to be the sum of 
meeting units devoted to the compensation, audit, corporate governance, nominating, non-managing director, 
succession and stock option committees. The number of observations varies because of missing data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max
   
Book value of assets ($ million) 354 12607 28411 717 355935
Capital expenditures over sales 346 0.07 0.06 0 0.34
Number of segments 357 2.9 1.9 1 9
Return on assets 349 0.15 0.07 -0.19 0.41
Firm age 356 54.9 35.5 0 146
Leverage 348 0.23 0.15 0 0.93
   
CEO=COB indicator 357 0.77 0.42 0 1
CEO tenure as director (years) 358 10.3 8.9 0 49
CEO ownership (%) 357 1.8 5.6 0 46.5
   
Board size 358 11.3 2.8 4 22
Number of committees 352 4.4 1.4 1 10
Fraction of outside directors 358 0.79 0.12 0.25 0.94
Total director meeting units 349 153.5 67.9 25 416 
Fraction of total meeting units spent on committee work 349 0.41 0.13 0.04 0.72 
Fraction of total meeting units spent monitoring 349 0.31 0.10 0.04 0.61 
 
Table 2: OLS regressions of the fraction of outside directors on firm characteristics 
The sample is a cross-section of 358 Fortune 500 firms in fiscal 1998. The dependent variable is the fraction of 
directors who do not work for the company as a proxy for the board’s monitoring intensity. CEO=COB is a 
dummy indicating whether the CEO is the chairman of the board (yes=1) as a proxy for CEO career concerns. 
Likewise, CEO tenure as director (=number of years the CEO has been on the board) is a proxy for CEO tenure 
in the firm and therefore a proxy for CEO career concerns. CEO tenure is measured in decades. CEO ownership 
is a proxy for the CEO’s incentive alignment. CEO ownership is measured as a fraction of total shares 
outstanding. Firm age is measured in decades. All regressions include dummy variables for 2-digit SIC codes. 
Absolute values of robust t-statistics are in brackets. Asterisks indicate significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 
0.10 (*) levels. 
 
 I II III IV IV
   
CEO=COB indicator 0.060*** 0.069*** 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.075***
 [3.50] [4.00] [3.67] [3.86] [4.37]
CEO tenure as director -0.026*** -0.053** -0.058** -0.024*** -0.060***
 [3.44] [2.40] [2.58] [3.10] [2.70]
CEO tenure as director 
squared 
 0.008 0.009  0.010*
  [1.39] [1.44]  [1.68]
CEO ownership -0.247 -1.089** -0.271* -1.082** -1.113**
 [1.55] [2.38] [1.74] [2.40] [2.43]
CEO ownership squared  2.453** 2.499** 2.563**
  [2.25] [2.29] [2.34]
Ln (book value of assets) 0.002 0.006 0.004 0.004 -0.001
 [0.29] [0.72] [0.51] [0.52] [0.12]
Capital expenditures over sales 0.073 0.040 0.072 0.041 0.019
 [0.67] [0.37] [0.67] [0.37] [0.18]
Number of segments -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006
 [0.98] [1.35] [1.08] [1.25] [1.28]
Return on assets 0.081 0.079 0.092 0.069 0.067
 [0.83] [0.79] [0.95] [0.69] [0.66]
Firm age 0.006*** 0.005** 0.006*** 0.005** 0.004*
 [2.78] [2.50] [2.70] [2.58] [1.81]
Leverage -0.042 -0.052 -0.051 -0.044 -0.063
 [0.61] [0.77] [0.75] [0.64] [0.91]
Board size   0.004*
   [1.67]
Number of committees  0.008*
   [1.78]
   
Observations 332 332 332 332 329
R-squared 0.314 0.34 0.32 0.334 0.356
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: OLS regressions of the fraction of total meeting units devoted to monitoring on 
firm characteristics 
The sample is a cross-section of 358 Fortune 500 firms in fiscal 1998. The dependent variable, the fraction of total 
meeting units devoted to monitoring, is a proxy for the board’s monitoring intensity. We define meeting units 
spent on monitoring duties to be the sum of meeting units devoted to compensation, audit, corporate governance, 
nominating, non-managing director, succession and stock option committees. Meeting units spent on a committee 
is the number of directors on the committee times the number of regular meetings of that committee during fiscal 
1998. Total meeting units are the sum of total meeting units spent on committee work and the meeting units 
spent on board work (=board size times number of regular board meetings). CEO=COB is a dummy indicating 
whether the CEO is the chairman of the board (yes=1) as a proxy for CEO career concerns. Likewise, CEO 
tenure as director (=number of years the CEO has been on the board) is a proxy for CEO tenure in the firm and 
therefore a proxy for CEO career concerns. CEO tenure is measured in decades. CEO ownership is a proxy for 
the CEO’s incentive alignment. CEO ownership is measured as a fraction of total shares outstanding. Firm age is 
measured in decades. All regressions include dummy variables for 2-digit SIC codes. Absolute values of robust t-
statistics are in brackets. Asterisks indicate significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels. 
 
 I II III IV
  
CEO=COB indicator 0.039*** 0.050*** 0.046*** 0.043***
 [2.65] [3.40] [3.09] [2.99]
CEO tenure as director -0.013 -0.054*** -0.058*** -0.010
 [1.56] [2.72] [2.98] [1.27]
CEO tenure as director squared 0.013** 0.013*** 
 [2.52] [2.64] 
CEO ownership -0.058 -0.770** -0.093 -0.760**
 [0.35] [2.23] [0.59] [2.18]
CEO ownership squared 2.029**  2.097**
 [2.02]  [1.99]
Ln (book value of assets) 0.011 0.015** 0.014* 0.013
 [1.36] [2.01] [1.74] [1.63]
Capital expenditures over sales -0.360*** -0.389*** -0.362*** -0.388***
 [2.69] [2.83] [2.70] [2.83]
Number of segments 0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.001
 [0.37] [0.03] [0.19] [0.15]
Return on assets 0.155 0.159 0.171* 0.143
 [1.49] [1.53] [1.66] [1.37]
Firm age 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001
 [0.29] [0.11] [0.14] [0.04]
Leverage -0.068 -0.082 -0.082 -0.069
 [1.16] [1.43] [1.41] [1.20]
  
Observations 327 327 327 327
R-squared 0.236 0.269 0.252 0.254
 
